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Any biography of historically influential individuals faces the problem of how to 
balance the achievements of their work and their private life. It is obvious that some 
scientific discovery, artistic breakthrough, or philosophical insight can be better ap-
preciated if private affairs, particularly including their psychological manifestations, 
accompanying the development of such an achievement are considered and under-
stood. Hankins ( 1979) supports this view: 
We can say at least one thing with certainty about biography: the ideas and 
opinions expressed by our subject came from a single mind and are integrated 
to the extent that that person was able to integrate them in his own thoughts. 
... Science is created by individuals, and however much it may be driven by 
forces from outside, these forces work through the scientist himself. ... Letters 
written under great emotional stress are the best grist for the biographer's 
mill, because they lead straight to the heart of the subject's personality and 
reveal the groundsprings from which his actions come." 
Nevertheless there is a tendency to underrepresent psychological elements in bio-
graphical work. According to von Meyenn (1997), 
a still neglected chapter in the history of science literature is the integration of 
psychological factors, which Stefan Zweig has demonstrated in his historical 
portraits. For a complete description of the forces shaping individuals and, 
hence, their scientific work, their psychological conditionality would have to 
be included together with internal scientific constraints and social bcrundarg 
conditions. Since in most cases access to the necessary source material is 
restricted by a screened private sphere, such an enterprise can only be carried 
out under exceptional circumstances. 
There are a number of cases in which, at least to some extent, such exceptional 
circumstances are given. For instance, quite a body of material is available for 
Helmholtz, Einstein, Poincare, Pauli, to mention just a few. For more sources the 
reader may consult classic volumes by Paulhan {1901), Wallas (1927), Hadamard 
(1954), or- more recently- Kantorovich (1993) or Miller {2000). Another selected 
collection of highly interesting quotes can be found in Simonton (1988), whose re-
search for three decades has been devoted to a detailed understanding of the psy-
chological processes associated with creative work and insight. 
On the basis of a wealth of biographk;;al material on creative thinking, Hadamard 
(1954) suggests four stages, each of which is inevitable for genuinely creative work. 
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He calls these stages preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification. The first 
and the last of them mainly function at the level of conscious, analytical thinking. 
The second and the third stages, however, strongly involve unconscious processes as 
the core of actual insight. Let me cite two quotations, by Poincare and Einstein, as 
examples. In his essay on "Mathematical Creation", Poincare (1913) says: 
One evening, contrary to my custom, I drank black coffee and could not 
sleep. Ideas rose in crowds; I felt them CQllide until pairs interlocked, so 
to speak, making a stable combination. ... It seems, in such cases, that 
one is present at one's unconscious work, made partially perceptible to the 
over-excited consciousness, yet without having changed its nature. Then we 
vaguely comprehend what distinguishes the two mechanisms or, if you wish, 
the working methods of the two egos. 
Most striking at first is this appearance of sudden illumination, a manifest 
sign of long, unconscious prior work. The role of this unconscious work in 
mathematical invention appears to me incontestable. ... Sudden inspirations 
... never happen except after some days of voluntary effort which has appeared 
absolutely fruitless and whence nothing good seems to have come, where the 
way taken seems totally astray. These efforts then have not been as sterile as 
one thinks. They have set going the unconscious machine and without them 
it would not have moved and would have produced nothing. 
Einstein (ca. 1905) responded to a questionnaire by the French psychologists 
Claparooe, Flournoy, and Fehr, published in L'Enseignement Mathematique, with 
the following words: 
The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play 
any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem to 
serve as elements of thought are certain signs and more or less clear images 
which can be 'voluntarily' reproduced and combined. 
There is, of course, a certain connection between those elements and relevant 
logical concepts. It is also clear that the desire to arrive finally at logically 
connected concepts is the emotional basis of this rather vague play with the 
above mentioned elements. But taken from a psychological viewpoint, this 
combinatory play seems to be the essential feature in productive thought -
before there is any connection with logical construction in words or other 
kinds of signs which can be communicated to others. 
The above mentioned elements are, in my case, of visual and some of muscular 
type. Conventional words or other signs have to be sought for laboriously 
only in a secondary stage, when the mentioned associative play is sufficiently 
established and can be reproduced at Will. 
These two selected quotations could be supplemented by many others. Here is 
a compact characterization of Hadamard's stages with some additional comments. 
1. Preparation: As Poincare emphasizes, no creative insight can "happen except 
after some days of voluntary effort which has appeared absolutely fruitless". 
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Intense conscious work on a problem, sometimes even for years (as Gauss 
(1805) reports in a letter to Olbers), precedes the final solution. Frustrating 
efforts without success characterize this stage. 
2. Incubation: At some point the problem is removed from conscious focus, inten-
tionally or by distraction, but the preceding conscious work "bas set going the 
unconscious machine". Unconscious elements "rose in crowds; I felt them col-
lide" (Poincare), and ''this combinatory play seems to be the essential feature 
in creative thought" (Einstein). According to Simonton's (1988) model, per-
mutations of unconscious elements form and dissolve involuntarily by chance. 
3. Rlumination: When "the mentioned associative play is sufficiently established" 
(Einstein), "pairs [of unconscious elements) interlocked, so to speak, making 
a stable combination" (Poincare). A particular configuration of unconscious 
elements stabilizes and, thereby, becomes conscious. This is the crucial mo-
ment in which an insight reveals itself. Often this happens holistically, not 
successively unfolded in time. 
4. Verification: Finally, this insight has to be reconstructed in a logical way, i.e. by 
a succession of rational arguments which can be communicated. "Conventional 
words or signs have to be sought for laboriously only in a secondary stage" 
(Einstein). 
In Simonton's fairly detailed "chance-configuration model" (Simonton 1988) for 
the second and third stage, there is one central issue: stability. The permutating 
unconscious elements during incubation are not (asymptotically) stable, but float 
freely, coming and going by chance. Only a particular one among these configu-
rations has stability properties implying its transition into a conscious idea. In a 
Darwinian formulation of creative processes, stability provides a selection criterion 
among many chance possibilities. For other features and consequences of this model, 
see Simonton {1988). 
The question of why and how particular configurations are distinguished by 
their stability remains unresolved though. In this respect, some speculative ideas 
addressed by Pauli and inspired by Jungian depth psychology are of interest. Pauli 
(1952) proposed the idea of psychophysical correspondences ("synchronicities") be-
tween psychological and physical subdomains of an underlying hypothetical back-
ground reality. 
The process of understanding nature, as well as the blissful experience in 
this process, when a new insight becomes conscious, seems to be based on 
a correspondence, a kind of congruence, of inner images pre-existing in the 
human psyche with external objects and their behavior. 
At this point it seems most satisfactory to me to introduce the postulate of 
a cosmic order, eluding our dirext access, which is distinct from the world of 
appearances. ... The relation between sensual perceptions and ideas would 
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then follow from the fact that both the soul of the observer and the observed 
object are governed by the same objective order. 
The origin of the stability properties addressed above could then be conceived at 
the level of this objective, psychophysically neutr~ order, and stable configurations 
would manifest themselves in the selection of particular correspondences out of many 
possible ones. Examples of serendipity as described by Simonton ( 1988), resembling 
features of Jungian synchronicity, are interesting candidates fitting into this picture. 
Summarizing, this contribution outlined how biographical material can be useful 
beyond simply presenting the life and work of an individual in some mutual rela-
tionship. It is clear that sometimes particular aspects of work can influence the 
development of an individual's life, and it is also clear that life events and their 
psychological repercussions can sometimes influence the direction of scientific work. 
Studying creative moments using biographical material on the relationship between 
life and work goes beyond such direct ideas of influence. 
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